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Introduction
The privatization has, without doubt, been one of 
the important factors that have contributed to the 
economic success of Poland in the past 25 years. 
What is more, due to the privatization model that was 
originally accepted, it was from the very beginning 
seen as a  sine qua non condition of successful 
transition.
There are two extreme models (Czekaj, 2005) of 
transformational privatization: a  market effective 
model and a social-enfranchisement model. The first 
(implemented in Poland) focuses on restructuring 
and improving performance of a company. Formally, 
the ownership changes are then made with the use 
of transparent, market-based procedures: mostly 
auctions and tenders. Another classification of 
privatization methods is as follows: case by case 
privatization and mass privatization programs. 
Contrary to e.g. the Czech strategy (based on voucher 
privatization), the Polish government relied on sales 
and PIPOs (Ausseng, 2002). The choice of method 
significantly affected the outcomes and capital 
market development. However, despite the attempts 
to adhere to this privatization model, the process was 
dependent on current politics and many other factors 
that temporarily caused deviations from the main 
idea. 
The program of industry reform, including 
privatization, was a political decision of the first Polish 
government after the fall of communism in 1989. 
The background of the decision was the conviction 
Abstract The paper focuses on the analysis of the privatization process conducted in the years 2008-2011 with 
an attempt to show a broad picture of privatization in Poland, indicate resources that still exist although 
hidden and show government practices in making privatization more effective or, on the contrary, in 
carrying  out  quasi-privatization  practices.  Three  main  issues  are  discussed.  First,  the  privatization 
process that took place in 2008-2011 seems to be to some extent only sham privatization - many 
of the companies were simply communalized, or transferred to other state-controlled companies and 
various government agencies. Thus, contrary to opinions expressed by the government officials, the 
privatization process is far from being terminated. A new approach used by the Ministry of Treasury 
is to create special purpose vehicles in order to sell the state-controlled assets more effectively. It 
turns out that 76% of privatized enterprises in the years 2008-2011 were sold via a tender or auction 
mechanism - the rest can be considered sham privatization. Huge resources are still to be privatized - 
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that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are sustainably 
ineffective, they do not function well, it is impossible 
to make them function well, and finally it is virtually 
impossible to create a rational and effective system of 
government supervision over an SOE. Hence, it was 
taken for granted that privatization is to positively 
affect the economic performance of privatized 
companies and improve the entire economy. Apart 
from this, privatization and ownership changes 
were seen as an indispensable part of other reforms: 
liberalization and introduction of competition. Other 
premises behind the privatization process included:
1) expected post-privatization gains: increased tax 
revenues from more efficient companies and lower 
prices (Davies 2005),
2)  ending of the state monopoly and fostering competition 
as an important driver of economic benefits leading to 
improved capacity, higher output and greater labor 
productivity,
3)  increased privatization revenues,
4)  efficient allocation of resources,
5)  encouragement of foreign investment,
6)  loss of government responsibility for capital intensive 
industries which allows the government to insulate 
itself from some unpopular decision (e.g. petrol or 
energy price hike),
7)  the need to increase discipline in public finance,
8)  a redefined notion of strategic industries - there was 
no need to keep a monopoly in e.g. telecommunication 
services,
9)  an attempt to depoliticize the links between enterprise 
and the state.
However, privatization was to be implemented 
cautiously, since as Djankov noticed (Djankov, 2002) 
when conducted properly, it may bring extremely 
positive results, but it can also be disastrous for 
the economy (Brown, 2009). In Poland, it started 
during the period of „extraordinary politics” in the 
years 1989-92. Privatization of small companies was 
very rapid, and almost complete by 1992 with 82% 
of such companies being privatized. The political 
reason behind the quick process was to create a large 
group of people (private owners) with commitment 
to the free market economy, who would never let 
the reforms be reversed. Medium and large sized 
firms were still a problem. At that time, the economy 
went into recession, unemployment soared. The 
Polish government introduced a  new privatization 
scheme called the Mass Privatization Program. The 
idea was that 512 firms were converted to joint stock 
companies and allocated to 15 National Investment 
Funds. Each citizen of Poland was offered a voucher 
giving its holder a share in an NIF. The program was 
a failure. Since then privatization has slowed down. 
It was not revived until the late 1990s and then early 
2010s. 
It is tempting to see how the revenues from the 
privatization process corresponds with politics. First, 
let us check how the privatization plan was executed. 
Up to the year 2000, the plan was successfully 
implemented (with a  few exceptions in the early 
1990s for which the early stage of privatization can 
be blamed) - revenues from privatization reached 
150% of the plan on average. The situation changed 
radically in the years 2001-2003, when the leftish 
party (Democratic Left Alliance) was in power (W. 
Kaczmarek was the Minister of State Treasury). 
The plan was fully implemented again in 2004, 
when J. Hausner was the Minister (the government 
was still leftish but the Minister was known for his 
liberal views). The revenues from privatization were 
disastrously low in the years 2005-2007 (11.3% of the 
plan in 2006), after the Law and Justice Party won 
the parliamentary elections in 2005 (Ministers A. 
Mikosz and W. Jasieński). Then Ministers: A. Grad, 
K. Budzanowski, and W. Karpiński followed after 
the success of the Civic Platform party in 2007 and 
the revenues were back close to the plan. Revenues 
were constantly growing from the very beginning 
up to the year 2000, then started to grow again 
in 2007 (reaching the peak in 2010). One can see 
clearly that the revenues were highly dependent on 
the political parties that were in power at different 
points in time, and their views on privatization. One 
aspect of the analysis of revenues from privatization 
is especially important. Despite their political views 
on privatization (whether and to what extent it 
should be continued) some Ministers (representing 
their parties) fully used the economic opportunities 
(booming markets) for increasing revenues from 
privatizations, and others squandered the chance 
the market offered. For example, in the years 2003-
2007 the stock markets were extremely bullish but 
there was no political will (2004 was an exception) 
to generate revenues from privatization. In the 
years 2007-2009 the markets were bearish (financial 
crises) which made it very difficult to achieve the 
privatization plan. Then the markets recovered and 
privatization was continued according to the plan. 
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As it has been pointed out many times, the overall 
conclusion is that privatization has proven its worth, 
although in many cases it could have been better 
managed (Nellis, 2000).
Table 1: Revenues from privatization, politics and economic situation
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This paper focuses on the analysis of the privatization 
process conducted in the years 2008-2011; it 
undertakes an attempt to show a broad picture of 
privatization in Poland; indicate resources that still 
exist although hidden and show government practices 
of carrying out quasi-privatization practices. It is not 
meant to assess the effectiveness of the privatization 
process. 
Three observations are posed:
1)  contrary to opinions expressed by the government 
officials, the privatization process is not about to 
end. The State Treasury (or some Ministries and 
government agencies) still owns assets, including 
companies, worth over 100 billion PLN, most of which 
should be privatized.
2)  the privatization process that took place in 2008-2011 
was clearly a  sham privatization. Few companies 
were sold via tender or auction mechanism, many 
were taken over by another SOE or state-controlled 
companies, communalized, or transferred to various 
government agencies.
3)  the new privatization strategy used by the Ministry of 
Treasury is to create special purpose vehicles (SPV) in 
order to sell the state-controlled assets more effectively.
This paper, through the analysis of outcomes of 
privatization, attempts to reveal the plan behind 
privatization. The privatization process outlined 
in official government documents (Plan ... 2009) 
was to reach two main goals: restructuring of the 
Polish economy and improving competitiveness 
of companies. The main criterion when choosing 
companies for privatization was reducing the role of 
the State in the industries where exercising corporate 
governance by institutions of public administration is 
not necessary. Earlier, a level of 10-20% as an optimal 
share of the public sector in the economy (standard 
for EU countries) was meant to be achieved by 2006. 
Technically speaking, in the period 2008-2011 the 
Minister of the Treasury planned to dispose of 740 
enterprises (out of 1234 companies, 350 of which are 
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in liquidation). The outcome of the implementation 
were 582 privatized companies. Now, one may get the 
impression that the privatization process progresses, 
especially when one looks at the official number of 
privatized companies and proceeds from privatization 
to the budget. However, due to the sham privatization 
(transfer of property rights between state agencies) 
and hiding of state-owned assets (excluding them 
from the Ministry of The Treasury authority) the 
picture concerning privatization the public receives 
is blurred. State-owned assets grow instead of being 
diminished, which contradicts the main idea of the 
program of industry reform, introduced by the first 
Polish government after the fall of communism in 
1989.
This paper is organized into five sections. In the 
introduction the main concepts of privatization 
in Poland and the difficulties of reform process 
are discussed, then observations are posed. Then 
the literature on the topic is presented. The 2008-
2011 privatization plan is confronted with its 
implementation in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 the main 
observations are presented. Chapter 5 concludes with 
the findings of the paper.
Literature Review
Privatization has been the subject of many studies 
and research papers. The amount of research 
intensified at the time of political changes taking 
place in Eastern Europe. In many papers analyzing 
privatization processes in transition countries, 
Poland was the first country the analyses were begun 
with (Nellis, 2000). The very first publication relied 
upon by many authors was a document presented by 
Belka (Belka at al., 1994) at The World Bank Forum. 
Polish authors investigating privatization process 
were (apart from the previously mentioned Belka), 
Błaszczyk (1995; 1999; 2003; 2007), Antczak (2007), 
Bałtowski (2007), Jarosz (2000), Kristof (2009; 2008) 
and Kozarzewski (2014). Moreover, the Ministry of 
Treasury successively publishes documents regarding 
privatization directions and commissions evaluations 
of the privatization process. This paper reviews 
the most recent papers - research published in the 
21st century that are comprehensive evaluations 
of ownership tranformations in Poland. A  brief 
examination of their main findings is presented 
below. Błaszczyk (2007) presented an overview of 
ownership transformations in Poland - through 
2006, 87.5% of initial privatization potential was 
transformed (that is 5747 out of 8453 companies). 
Despite changes in ownership structures the role of 
the public sector in the economy was still significant. 
The pace of privatization was criticized as it was 
slower than initially assumed. Kristof (2009) devoted 
her publication to ownership transitions in Poland 
between 2003 and 2006. The analysis began with 
rating assets in 1775 companies with some Treasury 
shareholding. The author analyzed efficiency of the 
state-controlled (over 50% ownership) companies in 
the years 2004-2006 according to data gathered by the 
Census Office in Poland. Through the end of 2006, 
354 of the enterprises were privatized; most of them 
showed higher profitability than in the previous year. 
Salejko (2012) analyzed obstacles to the privatization 
process. She described bureaucracy, lack of capital, 
regulatory issues, and psychological barriers. 
Kozarzewski (2014) presented a very comprehensive 
analysis of ownership changes in the Polish economy. 
The most interesting chapter dealt with effects and 
consequences of the ownership change. Kozarzewski 
divided the goals of ownership changes into 3 
categories: main goals (macro and microeconomic), 
additional goals (fiscal, social, political) and hidden 
goals. He claimed that the systemic goal was not 
reached – the public sector still stipulates about 20% 
of GDP. When it comes to the microeconomic goal, 
he commented that the private sector boasted better 
financial results than the public sector. The comments, 
however, were supported only by aggregate ratios 
based on Census Office reports. In terms of reaching 
fiscal goals, he stated that revenues from privatization, 
with the exception of a few years, were small and 
negligible from a  point of view of supporting the 
government’s financial needs. On the other hand, the 
growth of the capital market, including the Warsaw 
stock exchange, was mostly due to privatizing state-
owned companies. Finally, political goals were not 
achieved either - Polish society does not have the 
feeling that they have benefited from the privatization 
process. Privatization definitely did not become 
a  factor in fostering citizens’ support for market 
reforms. And last but not least, in Poland, contrary 
to other post-socialist countries, there have been 
no influential groups who have benefited from the 
privatization process itself. It is one of the significant 
successes of ownership changes in Poland. With the 
exception of Salejko, 2012) and Kozarzewski (2014), 
there are almost no scientific publications regarding 
the 2008-2011 period except for in the media and the 
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Ministry of Treasury reports. The Ministry’ reports 
present a comparison between the privatization plan 
and its implementation in particular years in relation 
to the number of privatized enterprises and revenues 
generated by the privatization process. 
Privatization Plan for 2008-2011 
versus implementation
The privatization plan for 2008-2011 published on 
April 22, 2008 was mentioned in D. Tusk’s (Polish 
Prime Minister) expose dated November 23, 2007. 
The Prime Minister expressed his support for 
ownership transformations in Poland thus: “There is 
no better protection against politicians interfering in 
the management of companies, than a real increase 
in the competitiveness of Polish companies and the 
Polish economy, this is achievable by wise, fast and 
dynamic privatization” (Tusk, 2007). The political aim 
was to facilitate the privatization process by increasing 
its transparency, simplification of procedures and 
shortening the duration of the privatization process. 
What is more, the new privatization policy assumed 
extension of the possibility of free transfer of shares 
held by the Treasury to local governments, aligning 
the remuneration of the Management Boards of 
the Treasury to market realities and a plan to sell 
company shares by public auctions. 
Referring to an evaluation of the privatization process 
of state-owned property in a 2007 report published 
by the Ministry of Treasury, on December 31, 2007 
the book value of state assets was 73.2 billion PLN. 
In accordance with the privatization plan the amount 
of state assets was intended to decrease. Indeed, 
in the period between the years 2008 and 2011 the 
value of state-owned property declined. The greatest 
difference occurred in the year 2010 when almost 1/3 
of planned ownership transitions took place. Apart 
from political declarations that the privatization 
process comes to its end, the summary of state assets 
in the year 2011 still reveals the book value of 46 
billion PLN with potential to be privatized.
Table 2: State-owned property in the years 2007-2011
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On March 31, 2008 the Minister of the Treasury 
could exercise the rights of shares in 1237 enterprises 
from various industries. This number included 
350 companies in liquidation, close to bankruptcy 
or not active enterprises and 887 active firms. The 
privatization plan mentioned 740 enterprises which 
were subject to privatization. The outcome of the 
plan implementation was 582 privatized companies, 
which is 78.64% of the plan. The privatization 
process embraced both small and medium-sized 
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enterprises. Nevertheless, some strategic companies 
were also (at least partially) privatized. An example 
of such companies were Telekomunikacja Polska, 
ENEA, PGE, Tauron, GPW and KGHM. The Polish 
government anticipated privatization revenue at the 
level of 54 billion PLN. The global financial situation 
and some privatization problems dropped this to 
44.02 billion PLN, which was 81% of the planned 
value. Specific data are discussed below.
Table 3: Revenues from privatization in 2008-2011
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In 2007 after political change in the governing party, 
the privatization process became one of the priorities. 
The acceleration of the privatization process was 
clearly visible. The number of privatized companies 
rose significantly - notably in 2010. With the increase 
in the number of privatized companies, revenues 
from privatization also rose. In 2008 the outcome 
from transitioned enterprises reached 103% of 
assumed revenue. Signs of the global financial crisis 
impacted privatization revenue in 2009. In that year 
only 55% of the expected outcome was executed. The 
following (2010) year brought the highest revenue 
in the analyzed period of time, which was 22 billion 
PLN and 88% of planned outcome. This result might 
have been determined by the number of transitioned 
companies, since nearly 1/3 of planned enterprises 
were privatized in that time. The result of the last year 
in the 2008-2011 plan was 87% completed. 
The privatization process in Poland in the years 
2008-2011 was implemented by various privatization 
methods. The largest number of enterprises (99 which 
was 15.7% of all in the plan) were transformed on the 
consent of the Council of Ministers. Revenue garnered 
by this transformation method were 3.58 billion PLN 
and 8.6% of the total sum. The method of privatization 
which provided the highest outcome (revenue-wise) 
was the sale of shares on the regulated market. By 
privatizing 53 companies the government gained 28.8 
billion PLN which was 69.6% of total privatization 
revenue. The analysis of data reveals that the number 
of transformed enterprises did not impact revenues. 
The main determinant of the revenue was the method 
of privatization. What is more, the analysis disclosed 
that 152 enterprises, which was 1/4 of all in the plan, 
did not bring any revenue to the state budget as their 
privatization methods were mostly municipalization 
or contribution to another firm. Other privatization 
models engaged in ownership transformation in 
Poland were public auctions, negotiations, public 
tenders, privatization on the agreement and according 
to the Act on Commercialization and Privatization 
art. 33 par. 5 pt 2.
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Table 4: Revenues (BN PLN) from various privatization methods versus number of companies (blue line)
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Table 5: Privatization revenues (m PLN) by voivodeships and number of enterprises (red line)
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The administrative division of Poland divides the 
country into 17 voivodeships. The biggest number 
of privatized firms 102 (16%) were located in 
Śląskie voivodeship and brought 12 billion PLN to 
the government budget. The highest privatization 
revenue was garnered from privatization of 91 
companies located in Mazowieckie voivodeship. 
It was an amount of 14.61 billion PLN which was 
35.2% of the total revenue. Other provinces brought 
considerably lower privatization income. The lowest 
number of transformed enterprises was situated in 
Lubuskie voivodeship, also the lowest revenue was 
garnered from this location.
Research analysis
Before any discussion concerning privatization is 
begun, one should realize what assets are in the 
possession of the state, which companies or assets 
the State Treasury should and intends to control and 
which should be disposed of.
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Table 6: The State Treasury possessions (31.12.2012)
No. Components Examples
Value
(bn PLN)
1 National heritage relics, museums, libraries, archives
2 Natural resources water, forest, minerals, national parks
3 Land, real estate 34,9% of Poland's territory 363.00
4 Infrastructure facilities roads 47.71
5
Assets supervised by separate 
entities
ANR, AMW, WAM, ARM, PGL-Lasy 
Państwowe
323.29
6 Public finance assets
ZUS, NFZ, PAN, NCBiR, NCN, ARiMR, 
PARP, universities, government and 
municipal agencies
7 Stocks and shares
controlled by the Ministry of Treasury or 
other ministries
179.69
8 Others ports, research institutes, BGK
Source: Based on: Sprawozdanie o stanie mienia SP 2012
Table 7: Government entities that represent the State Treasury (31.12.2012)
No. Entities that represent the state treasury  Number of companies 
1 Ministry of Treasury 713
2 Ministry of Economy 19
3 Ministry of Administration 1
4 Ministry of Transport 4
5 Ministry of Finance 2
6 Ministry of Sport and Tourism 2
7 Ministry of Defense 14
8 ANR 45
9 PGL National Forest 22
10 WAM 4
11 AMW 6
12 Voivodes 2
Source: Based on: Sprawozdanie o stanie mienia SP 2012
Clearly, out of the list presented in table 6 (with 
very few exceptions) only stocks and shares can be 
a subject of further privatization process. The rights 
to represent the State Treasury in companies in which 
the State has shares belong to various government 
entities listed in table 7. 
The State Treasury has shares in three types of 
enterprises: sole traders of the State Treasury, public 
companies listed on the stock exchange and non-
public companies. Sole traders of the State Treasury 
are specific state-owned companies (whose number 
diminishes) that have been commercialized but 
not yet privatized, and the State Treasury still owns 
100% of the shares. Most of them are infrastructural 
companies (e.g. Gaz System S.A., PERN S.A. Poczta 
Polska S.A.), those implementing restructuring tables 
(ARP S.A.) and others with specific purposes (e.g. 
TVP S.A., Totalizator Sportowy, Kompania Węglowa 
S.A.). They are not listed on a stock exchange and the 
value given in Table 8 is a book value. Similarly, the 
value of shares in non-public companies is a book 
value.
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Table 8: Estimated value of stocks and shares owned by the State Treasury 31.12.2012
No. Components Estimated value in bn PLN
1 Shares in sole traders of the State Treasury 51.84
2 Shares in companies listed on a stock exchange 108.37
3 Shares in non-public companies 19.48
Source: Based on: Sprawozdanie o stanie mienia SP 2012
The market value of the public companies on January 
18, 2014 (as shown in Table 9) is 103 billion PLN, 
which means a slight drop as compared to the data 
from December 31, 2012 (103 billion versus 108 
billion PLN). However, since some of the companies 
are said to belong to strategic sectors (which are to 
be controlled by the government), one can assume 
an optimal ownership structure suggested in the very 
right column (after FOR Report -. Wojciechowski, 
2010). It turns out then, that the State Treasury can 
keep control over strategic industries and still reach 
61.82 billion PLN revenue from privatizing very 
liquid, stock exchange listed companies.
Table 9: Estimated value of stocks owned by the State Treasury (18.01.2014)
Name the ST shares (%)
Number of 
shares
Market value
(mln PLN)
Entity represen-
ting the state 
treasury
Optimal ST 
shares (%)
Optimal ST 
shares value
PHN  75.00% 32 538 003 882 ST 0% 882
PGNiG  72.40% 4 271 911 724 21 400 ST 20% 15 488
PGE  61.88% 1 157 124 546 19 200 ST 20% 12 994
JSW  55.16% 64 775 542 3 240 ST 0% 3 240
Lotos  53.18% 69 076 392 2 450 ST 20% 1 529
Enea  51.50% 227 385 698 3 010 ST 0% 3 010
PKP Cargo 51.70% 22 405 754 2 025 PKP SA 0% 2 025
Energa  51.52% 144 928 000 3 400 ST 0% 3 400
Ciech 38.72% 20 407 437 610 ST 0% 610
PZU 35.18% 30 385 253 13 000 ST 20% 5 609
GPW  34.99% 14 688 470 574 ST 0% 574
Grupa Azoty 33.00% 32 734 509 1 900 ST 20% 748
KGHM  31.79% 63 589 900 7 240 ST 20% 2 685
PKO BP 31.39% 392 406 277 15 800 ST 20% 5 733
Tauron  30.06% 526 883 897 2 220 ST 20% 743
PKN Orlen 27.52% 117 710 196 4 960 ST 20% 1 355
BOŚ 56.62% 12 951 960 577 NFOŚiGW 0% 577
RAFAMET 47.28% 2 042 214 31 ARP 0% 31
Polimex-Mostostal 22.48% 300 000 001 39 ARP 0% 39
Interferie 66.81% 9 731 625 46 KGHM SA 0% 46
AB SA 5.50% 891 802 28 PKO BP 0% 28
EC Będzin 14.88% 468 821 10 BGK i SP 0% 10
Bogdanka 9.76% 3 320 377 415 PZU 0% 415
Paged  8.37% 1 265 000 48 Lasy Państwowe 0% 48
Total market value 103 106 61 821
market value
Source: Based on data from www.stooq.pl
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However, most of the companies (713), including 
the stock exchange listed companies, are under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Treasury. Other 
government entities (compare Table 8) control 
the rest, most of which could be sold, and thus 
contribute to higher revenues from privatization. 
The often considered examples of such companies 
are: defense sector companies, railroad companies, 
airports, companies and land controlled by AMW (6 
companies) and ANR (45 companies) agencies. Their 
value is difficult to estimate - their book value (on 
December 31, 2012) is 34 billion PLN (Sprawozdanie 
2012: p. 75). The market value must be much higher. 
Anyway, having assumed that the State Treasury: 
1)  keeps control over strategic industries and sells 61.82 
billion PLN worth of shares in stock exchange listed 
companies, 
2)  sells half of the companies supervised by other than 
the Minister of State Treasury entities (16.89 billion 
PLN of book value),
3)  sells half of the non-public companies (9.74 billion 
PLN of book value).
Then, the expected revenues would amount to at 
least 88.45 billion PLN. Further, having assumed 
that the average revenue from privatization in the 
years 1993-2012 was 8.38 billion PLN, the 88.45 PLN 
could enable the continuation of privatization at the 
previous pace for another 10 years. The presented 
numbers clearly show that the whole process is far 
from being terminated. 
It is claimed here that the privatization process that 
took place in Poland in the years 2008-2011 was to 
some extent a  sham privatization. The majority of 
companies were sold via tender or auction mechanism. 
Nevertheless, some were taken over by another SOE 
or state-controlled companies, communalized, or 
transferred to various government agencies. As 
the previous analysis disclosed, the privatization 
process involved privatization methods which 
did not generate any revenues to the government. 
Communalization, contribution to other SOE 
companies and transfer of assets or companies to 
various government agencies were examples of such 
methods. It is vital to emphasize that usage of the 
above mentioned transformation methods allows 
the State Treasury to continue to control these 
enterprises. Of 634 privatization projects, 76% were 
sold by consent of the Council of Ministers, publicly 
announced auction, public negotiations, sale of shares 
on the regulated market, public tender or provisions 
of the agreement. But the remaining 24% were sham 
privatized by municipalization, contribution to 
another SOE and other sham privatization methods.
Table 10: Sham privatization in 2008-2011 (based on number of projects)
   
78
 
76% 
privatized by
24% privatized by
consent the Council 
of Ministers
16%
publicly announced 
auction
11%
public negotiations
11%       
                   others 
                    3%
sale on the regulated 
market
8%
public tender
8%
provisions of the 
agreement
5%
art. 33 par. 5 pt 2 
14%
others
1%
municipalization
12%
contribution to 
another SOE
11%
Source: Based on the Ministry of Treasury data
The municipalization of the State Treasury may occur 
through the transfer of property of the State Treasury 
for the benefit of local government units. At the 
request of the executive body of local government, 
the Ministry of Treasury may transfer a free package 
of shares in favor of the local government unit or 
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units of local self-government relationship. The 
condition is that economic activities performed by 
such a company are the task that has to be fulfilled 
by the unit of local government or compound of 
local government units (art. Paragraph 4b. 1 of the 
Act of 30 August 1996 on Commercialization and 
Privatization). Municipalization is related mainly 
to public use or utility companies such as public 
transport, water supply, wholesale centers, industrial 
parks, etc. In the analyzed period of privatization in 
Poland the majority (46) of communalized firms were 
public transport enterprises. 
Contribution to another SOE is one of the 
procedures of direct privatization provided in 
the Act on Commercialization and Privatization. 
Contribution to a company leads to acquisition of 
the appropriate number of shares or stocks. This 
method of privatization is used in particular for 
small and medium-sized businesses that require 
significant expenditures and investments. It is 
directed towards providing the company with reliable 
strategic investors (domestic or foreign). During the 
privatization process in Poland the biggest part (60%) 
of contributed enterprises became a part of the ARP. 
Significant contributions were also made to Bumar, 
PHN and PSE Operator. Enterprises contributed to 
another SOE were mostly manufacturing facilities, 
power stations and research centers. This sham 
privatization significantly decreased acquired 
privatization revenue in Poland in the years 2008-
2011.
The Ministry of Treasury supervises 86% of all 
companies that are in the possession of the State 
Treasury (see Table 8). Hence, it is justified to focus 
on their strategy in terms of privatization - it affects 
most companies and it is often followed by other 
government agencies. In the years 2008-2011 over 
580 enterprises were privatized, the plan for 2012-
2013 assumed privatizing another 300 companies 
from 25 industries to be sold. Thanks to this the 
share of private ownership (80% of GDP at the end 
of 2011) was to increase and the competitiveness and 
efficiency of the Polish economy was to be improved. 
However, the companies that were left to be privatized 
in both periods (2008-2011 and 2012-2013) were not 
appealing to investors. Hence, at different points of 
time, the Ministry of Treasury tested new strategies to 
sell the remaining companies successfully. 
Since 2008 the Ministry of Treasury has been facing 
the obvious problem: the pool of enterprises to be 
privatized has come from unattractive sectors or most 
of the companies in the pool struggled with serious 
operational or financial problems. 483 companies 
were in the initial privatization pool, 24.23% of which 
generated a loss in 2008. The average ROS and ROE 
for all these companies in 2008 were -0.96% and 
-8.9% respectively. The important question was then 
how to deal with the pool of companies, a quarter of 
which were close to bankruptcy. The answer was to 
pack them into coherent entities, put an attractive 
label on thes packages, and create special purpose 
vehicles (SPV) that would attract investors and enable 
the sale of the state-controlled assets more effectively. 
One of the first attempts was PHN. The idea was to 
consolidate some SOEs (Intraco, Budexpo, Dalmor 
and many more) under an attractive real estate 
label and go public. The PHN portfolio eventually 
included 180 properties and 1.3 hectares of land. Its 
IPO was postponed from July 2012 to February 2013, 
but finally it was relatively successful. 
The ARP is another attempt to deal with companies 
that are to be privatized. Apart from a  portfolio 
of companies they supervise (net assets worth 
over 5 billion PLN), the agency fosters innovation 
and growth of innovative middle sized and large 
companies. The new strategy of ARP is to be 
actively involved in fostering an innovative Polish 
economy, including creation of new companies that 
will implement breakthrough inventions. Blue Gas 
(shale gas) and Nano Carbon (graphene production) 
companies are good examples of such companies.
Still another example of creating SPV is PGZ (Polish 
Defense Group) located in Radom. This group is an 
attempt to consolidate the Polish defense industry. 
It will include PHO (Polish Defense Holding, 
previously Bumar), 11 companies controlled by the 
Ministry of Defense, HSW and companies from the 
defense sector controlled by the Ministry of Treasury. 
Creation of the group will probably be followed by 
a decision to go public.
Finally, PIR (Polish Investments in Development) is 
a new company founded by the Ministry of Treasury 
with the aim of fostering Polish investments - mostly 
investments in infrastructure (production and 
distribution of energy and gas), building shale gas 
resources, transport infrastructure, waste utilization, 
and telecommunication. The company will get 
financing (up to 40 billion PLN) from privatization 
revenues (sale of PGE, PKO BP, PZU and Ciech 
packages).
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Another strategy, although aimed at individual 
investors was Civic Shareholding (see: www.
akcjonariatobywatelski.pl). It was initiated in 2010 
when the Ministry of Treasury decided to sell PZU, 
Tauron and the WSE. The assumption was that, 
instead of having to compete with large institutional 
investors for shares (which often involved taking 
loans to tackle expected huge reductions), a certain 
number of shares is allocated exclusively for individual 
shareholders. It was to facilitate share purchases by 
individual investors in Treasury companies, as well 
as encourage conscious participation of the general 
public in securities investments. The program 
was relatively successful: 230 thousand individual 
investors bought Tauron shares, 250 thousand - PZU 
shares, 323 thousand - WSE shares in 2010, and 168 
thousand investors in 2011 bought JSW shares. The 
number of individual investment accounts grew from 
1.13 million in 2009 to 1.53 million in 2012. However, 
the stock market flotations that followed (PAK - 14 
thousand individual investors, Energa - 66 thousand 
individual investors) were not that successful and 
Civic Shareholding is now mostly an educational 
program.
It can be seen that some effort is made towards selling 
existing SOEs, in some cases with a use of sophisticated 
marketing tools and special purpose vehicles such as 
PHN. On the other hand, new SOEs are created, with 
the noble aim of fostering innovation, restructuring 
and infrastructure renewal. Still, the promise at the 
Ministry of Treasury website that PIR will invest only 
in highly profitable projects is disarming. Besides, 
revenues from privatization are often transferred to 
the newly created state-owned enterprises. In the 
years 2012-2013 the Ministry of Treasury planned to 
obtain revenues from privatization amounting to 15 
billion PLN. At the same time, PIR is offered financing 
of 40 billion PLN that would come from privatization 
revenues. There is an obvious clash between the two 
strategies. 
Conclusions
Assessment of 2008-2011 privatization is relatively 
positive. In terms of the effects: the number of 
privatized companies and revenues from the process, 
the privatization plan was fulfilled. The vision 
expressed in D. Tusk’s speech dated November 23, 
2007 in which the Prime Minister emphasized his 
support for ownership transformations in Poland was 
then carried out successfully by mostly the Ministry 
of Treasury which controls most State Treasury assets. 
On March 31, 2008 the Ministry of Treasury 
controlled 1237 enterprises from various industries. 
This number included 350 companies in liquidation, 
close to bankruptcy or not active enterprises and 
887 active firms. The 2008-2011 privatization plan 
assumed that 740 enterprises would be privatized. 
The outcome of the plan implementation was 582 
privatized companies, which is 78.64% of the plan. 
The Polish government assumed privatization 
revenue at the level of 54 billion PLN. The global 
financial situation and some privatization problems 
dropped this to 44.02 billion PLN, which was 81% of 
the planned value. In this paper it was shown which 
years brought the most revenues, which privatization 
methods were used, and which region generated the 
most revenues.
It was found that most of the companies (713) that 
belong to the State Treasury are controlled by the 
Ministry of Treasury. Other government entities 
supervise the rest, most of which could be sold and 
contribute to higher revenues from privatization. 
The often considered examples of such companies 
are: defense sector companies, railroad companies, 
airports, companies and land controlled by the AMW 
(6 companies) and ANR (45 companies) agencies. 
Anyway, it can be estimated that the expected 
revenues from selling all those possessions would 
amount to at least 88.45 billion PLN. Further, having 
assumed that the average revenue from privatization 
in the years 1993-2012 was 8.38 billion PLN, the 88.45 
PLN could enable the continuation of privatization at 
the previous pace for another 10 years. The presented 
numbers clearly show that the whole process is far 
from being terminated. 
We also claimed that the privatization process that 
took place in Poland in the years 2008-2011 was 
to some extent a sham privatization. The majority 
of companies were sold via tender or auction 
mechanism. Nevertheless, a  significant part (24%) 
were taken over by other SOEs or state-controlled 
companies, communalized, or transferred to various 
government agencies. This is considered sham 
privatization, since presenting contributions to SOEs 
(Bumar, Tauron, Kompania Węglowa, Lotos, Ciech, 
PHN, Enea) or government agencies (ARP, ANR) 
as genuine privatization is obviously misleading. It 
simply contradicts the main goals behind privatization 
as outlined in official government documents 
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(restructuring the Polish economy and improving 
competitiveness of companies). There might be three 
possible reasons behind the sham privatization. 
First, communalization is always easier than genuine 
privatization. Second, the red tape authorities only 
pay lip service to the main ideas of privatization, 
whereas truly they try to keep the government’s 
influence over many areas of the economy. Finally, 
certain state-owned assets are put aside (excluded 
from the direct control of the Ministry of Treasury) to 
be used as „political tools” during negotiations with 
political circles or parties.
483 companies were in the initial privatization 
pool in 2008. 24.23% of the companies generated 
a loss in 2008, which proved their unattractiveness. 
Anticipating this problem the Ministry of Treasury 
decided to pack some of them into coherent entities, 
put an attractive label upon these packages, and create 
special purpose vehicles (SPV) that would attract 
investors and enable the sale of the state-controlled 
assets more effectively. One of the first attempts was 
PHN (the real estate sector). PHN’s IPO was relatively 
successful and proved the method was well thought 
out. 
Other seemingly similar cases do not follow the 
same strategy. It is rather an attempt to supervise 
more companies (ARP), create so-called national 
champions (PGZ - Polish Defense Group), or foster 
growth of specific industries (PIR), and basically it is 
contradictory to genuine privatization. To prove that, 
it is enough to quote plans of the Ministry of Treasury 
to obtain in 2013-14 revenues from privatization 
amounting to 15 billion PLN. At the same time, PIR 
is offered financing of 40 billion PLN most of which 
would come from privatization revenues. It is what A. 
Sieroń (from the Mises Institute) calls a „have your 
cake and eat it too” strategy.
The privatization process in Poland, despite having 
its ups and downs, is relatively successful. We have 
avoided the failures of mass privatization, the 
process is consistently implemented (at least after 
2008). Privatization generates revenues for the 
government and contributes to a real increase in the 
competitiveness of Polish companies and the Polish 
economy. However, the process, although facilitated 
recently, is far from being terminated. What is more, 
some of the activities of the Ministry of the Treasury 
seem to go backwards: the assets controlled by the 
State Treasury grow instead of being diminished, 
some companies are privatized and at the same time 
others are created.
References
Antczak, M. (2007). Kondycja finansowa przedsiębiorstw 
sektora publicznego w Polsce z perspektywy całej 
gospodarki i badań empirycznych. In Balcerowicz, E. 
(ed.), Przedsiębiorstwa sektora prywatnego i publicznego 
w Polsce (1999-2005) (pp. 35-46). Warszawa: Centrum 
Analiza Społeczno-Ekonomicznych.
Bałtowski, M., Żminda, S. (2007). Struktura własnościowa 
i branżowa a wyniki największych polskich przedsiębiorstw. 
In Balcerowicz, E. (ed.), Przedsiębiorstwa sektora 
prywatnego i publicznego w Polsce (1999-2005) (pp. 
21-34). Warszawa: Centrum Analiza Społeczno-
Ekonomicznych.
Belka, M., Schaffer, M., Estrin, S., Singh, I. (1994, 
September). Evidence from a Survey of State-Owned, 
Privatised, and Emerging Private Firms. Paper presented at 
Workshop on Enterprise Adjustment in Eastern Europe, 
The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Błaszczyk, B. (2005). The Lisbon Strategy: A Tool for 
Economic and Social Reforms in the Enlarged European 
Union. Warsaw: Centre for Social and Economic Research. 
(UMI no. 838147).
Błaszczyk, B., Kozarzewski, P. (2007). Zmiany w polskich 
przedsiębiorstwach. Własność restrukturyzacja, efektywność 
(Report No. 70). Warszawa: Centrum Analiz Społeczno-
Ekonomicznych.
Błaszczyk, B., Hoshi, I., Woodward, R. (2003). Secondary 
Privatization in Transition Economies: The Evolution of 
Enterprise Ownership in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovenia. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Brown, J., Earle, J., Gehlbach, S. (2009). Helping Hand 
or Grabbing Hand? State Bureaucracy and Privatization 
Effectiveness (Working papers series). Retrieved from 
Social Science Research Network. (UMI no. 3958).
Czekaj, J., Kowalski, A. (2005). Polski model prywatyzacji 
z rozwój rynku kapitałowego, in: Raport 
o przekształceniach własnościowych w 2004 
roku. Retrieved from www.msp.gov.pl/download.
php?s=1&id=1023.
Davies, L., Wright, K., Price, C. (2005). Experience 
of Privatisation, Regulation and Competition. Lessons 
for Governments, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, 
University of East Anglia (CCP Working Paper 05-5). 
Retrieved from Social Science Research Network. (UMI 
no. 911561).
Djankov, S., Murrel, P. (2002). Enterprise Restructuring in 
Transition: A Quantitative Survey (working papers series). 
Wiktor Patena, ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN POLAND IN THE YEARS 2008-2011 - OUTCOMES AND PROSPECTS,
57-70 10.14636/1734-039X_10_2_003 www.e-finanse.com
University of Information Technology and Management Sucharskiego 2, 35-225 Rzeszów
70
 
Financial Internet Quarterly „e-Finanse” 2014, vol. 10/nr 2, p.  
Retrieved from Social Science Research Network. (UMI 
no. 238716).
Jarosz, M. (2000). Ten Years of Direct Privatisation. 
Warsaw: ISP PAN. Kozarzewski, P. (2006). Prywatyzacja 
w krajach postkomunistycznych. Warsaw: ISP PAN. 
Kozarzewski, P., Bałtowski, M. (2014). Zmiana 
własnościowa polskiej gospodarki 1989 - 2013, Warszawa, 
PWE, s. 429.
Kristof, A. (2009). Jednoosobowe spółki Skarbu Państwa 
a proces przekształceń własnościowych (założenia 
programowe a diagnoza stanu). Paper presented at VI 
Zjazd Katedr Ekonomii Ekonomiczne wyzwania XXI 
wieku. Międzyzdroje, Poland.
Nellis, J. (2000). The World Bank, Privatisation and 
Enterprise Reform in Transition Economies. 
A Retrospective Analysis (OED Background Paper). 
Retrieved from Social Science Research Network. UMI no. 
288903.
Plan prywatyzacji na lata 2008-2011 (2009). 
http://prywatyzacja.msp.gov.pl/pr/plan-prywatyzacji/plan-
prywatyzacji-na-l-1/4047.
Wojciechowski, W. (2010). Prywatyzacja. Wciąż 
niewykorzystane szanse. Warszawa. Fundacja Forum 
Obywatelskiego Rozwoju.
Salejko-Szyszczak, I. (2012). Ewolucja barier prywatyzacji 
przedsiębiorstw państwowych w Polsce. Prace Naukowe 
Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, nr 246. p. 
413.
Sprawozdanie o stanie mienia Skarbu Państwa (2012). 
Warszawa. Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa.
Wiktor Patena, ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN POLAND IN THE YEARS 2008-2011 - OUTCOMES AND PROSPECTS,
57-70 10.14636/1734-039X_10_2_003 